Declaration of Human Rights; 1798-version
see also in detail the V.N.-version ).

Charter of Order

The Declaration of Human Rights of 1789 founded the freedom of the French after the revolution to the example of the declaration of independence in America. With this revolution influenced by the ideas of the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) came it in France nationally and internationally, to opposition with the philosophy of Enlightenment of the centuries before in which gradually religion and science had drifted apart. It was now science itself that philosophically got divided. It was no longer a gentleman's discussion between empiricists and rationalists about the value of inductive - from the specific to the general; - and deductive - from the general to the specific - reasoning; it became a political struggle between liberals and conservatives. With Rousseau, himself an emotionally challenged person of the common people, was civilization from then on not right away considered good or elevated, but on the contrary bad; the emotional was the good of nature and was superior to reason; and the interest of the individual was subordinate to that of the group. The sovereignty of reason which would not so much accept the lead of the sensual as the lead of the - possibly not provable - moral principle, was, also following empirical philosophy of eighteenth century England, called in question as being a source of knowledge and subjected to a system of political, democratic control from without. The man of nature had to prevail over man of culture, feeling had to prevbail over the mind. The conflict between empirical feeling en rational understanding, arising from the philosophy of Enlightenment, materialized with the impurities of the philosopher's ego in that Revolution. In christian reform reached Enlightenment a deadlock, being ignorant and thus in fact unenlightened about what factually the concern of authority was, who would have the last word with the plea for the individual person heard since the fall of catholic Rome. Christian Reform, in countering the religious and noble ego, only resulted in more ego. In fact could the ego of societal classes and status groups - which indian-style taken together could be called castes - not arrive at purification in the Enlightenment, that indeed did justice to the truth of the individual, but couldn't find any liberation in a commonly felt respect for the person. The classical ideal of an integrity of thought and feeling in one universal science, in one historically founded classical order, was lost fighting about political power. Rationality and religiosity not of love for nature, the way Rousseau put it, turned out to be nothing but treason to human nature. That passion, that maybe positively aggressive and uncontrolled nature of what he called the 'noble savage' is the honesty that should liberate thus was the creed of the Revolutionary 'Enlightenment' that opposed the failed elitist 'Enlightenment'. In fact was the liberal philosophy of the revolutionaries the manifestation of the concept of enlightenment that itself therewith found its demise. The fray of the ego of the philosophers in that idea of enlightenment, that notion of a separated, individualized and emancipated self, could find no freedom from fear and misery in service to the ideal. From the philosophy of reason one had landed in a philosophy of rationalistic repression and self-righteousness. Together with the philosophers Voltaire and Diderot arose, as the upbeat to the later twentieth century horrors - that in the form of world wars would manifest themselves as the backlash of colonial violence - a willingness for violence because that would be the only way to counter and overturn the cramped falsehood and possessiveness of especially the clergy and the nobles exploiting being a burden to the citizen (or the colonial subject or slave). With the revolutionary liberalism which, notwithstanding nineteenth century romantic and puritan efforts to restore the classical order, freaked out a century later in communism and fascism, then smothered in the blood of the ignorant citizens the last bit of philosophical pride and self-esteem of the westerner who, at the beginning of the twenty-first century is at a loss with the ever lingering opposition of, this time, the fundamentalists. For the struggle of the classes continues as long as those classes due to the absence of a philosophy of association try to subdue or exclude one another.

The drama of western philosophy is that with all the manslaughter of the citizen missing a good lead the philosophers each for themselves are still quite right; of course must reason prevail, experience be decisive and must we become brothers without the falsehood of a culture going against nature. Naturally, but what for God is the integrity of this philosophy, what is the place of all these separate ideas in one coherent culture? Christianity fell short with itself, more was needed, at least more respect for other cultures that, so was discovered with imported china from the Far East and such, possibly also could be offering something. The Germans I. Kant (1724-1804) and A. Schopenhauer (1788-1860) were of no insignificant contribution in the nineteenth century to put the dualistic strife to an end and arrive at a better cultural integration. But in de end proved I. Kant, the philosopher of dualism, noumenal (to the spirit) be it phenomenal (to the phenomenon), not capable of proper reference and turned Schopenhauer, who was capable, out not to be able to attach much belief to the authority of that reference, found in eastern philosophy. He indeed connected the eastern with the western of philosophy, but remained spiritually impure in the dark with his disbelief in a controlling personal Godhead. He verily, as it should, discriminated between an A and an A, two identical variables that nevertheless differ in time and space, but was with the free from illusion identifying of the phenomenal with the noumenal of the philosophy of I. Kant that he wanted to perfect and complete, just like Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) with his denial of the miraculous caught in the impersonal, which, with the denial of the cyclic and balanced of the person, inevitably leads to chaos. And so arose in the nineteenth century the further breaking up of science in the analytical schools and esoteric schools of psychology and theosophy that more doctrinaire than philosophical emphasized a self-realization which also couldn't get beyond the still more in books condensed ego of the antroposophical purple underwear that had to be rejected by the Indian guru J. Krishnamurti (1895-1986) and the finite cigar in the mouth of S. Freud (1856-1939) which cost him his health.

The philosophy, gradually repressed by political and therapeutic practices of problem-solving, died in the twentieth century a silent death in the existentialism that could only be disgusted with the lies of modern violent mankind. For the old existentialist J.P. Sartre (1905-1980), who with his love for drugs and sex had lived against Father Time with His classical morality, it was too late to consult Freud to cure from his Oedipus complex of having went against that same father. Freud, before him, could solve the problem himself neither by his speculations and turn the tide of the philosophy of violence of the class struggle that went further than that of laborers against capitalists the way Karl Marx (1818-1883) to the ideal had pictured it to himself. We know that the national-socialistic fascists of the freaked-out state-formalism and -militarism are just as dangerous co-actors and that finally there are the fundamentalists to teach us once and for all a terrorist lesson for being the arrogance of socialistic-fascistic capitalism that considers poverty a sin...

For us remains to be said that we at the beginning of the twentieth century seriously have lost our philosophical way. We don't, more or less standardized, tick right, to the order of the apparent sun; we are not in order with our philosophies of morality, justice, economy and time-management. We in fact have lost the integrity of the mindful and are hardly capable of staying reasonable with the problems of cultural integration, unemployment, the care for the elderly and common heath-care. The judicial-economic paradigm of controlling the state with money and books of law is compromised. The two sciences don't manage that well alone being in power, the philosophers are at their last gasp, the psychologists and psychiatrists are constantly embarrassed adapting dysfunctioning people to the ill-willed system and the stock of gurus from the far east is also depleted, for they have said and modeled all they could. 'Please process your data, they suffice', is their message.

so be it with with the chaos of post-modern time in which even punk-hair and a leather jacket looks bourgeois. We'll have to get our things back on the road again and properly investigate to make sure what exactly is holding us back. Is it really so that we with A. Schopenhauer, Madame H. P. Blavatski (1831-1891) and A. Bailey (1880-1949) know enough of eastern philosophy? Is it really so that the rationalism of Descartes would hold no value or sway anymore, that the Hare Krishna's are a cult, that the ether is nothing but the medium of the radio, and that the empiricism of the English would be so materialistic? Is it really so that the liberal, the communist and the socialist, nationalist be it idealist, offer no essential contribution with the love for the natural community-person? Is Einstein really our savior to determine what is absolute in the universe? No of course not. In fact is, filognostically seen, the philosophy, or science for itself, notwithstanding these questions, not the problem at all. Philosophy, together with its empirical result is, including theology and psychology, the solution thus, but then with the restriction of working like a good paradigm which combines to the point of religion with a sane rational spirituality and an empirical strategy of respect for the person. No single truth of the person is in fact wrong as long as that person knows who he is, what his freedom to move, emancipating or sliding down, would be and where he stands in society.

Thus may one, philosophically of opposition neither contend that the ascending, inductive process of acquiring knowledge, in India called aroha, of the transcending or rising above, moving from the particular to the general, would be wrong because of the induction-problem that not all swans are white. Religious people are, even though for instance the Vishnu-adepts in India are not in favor of it, doing nothing else when they pray to realize themselves their Godhead, making up half the world-population being predominantly peaceful and sane with it. Neither is the avaroha-process of the more scientific deductive, rational and principally responsible descending from the general to the specific of a material distinction to be considered wrong. Jesus, Mohammed, Krishna, you and also me thus descended from heaven, even though our premiss of divinity cannot be proven that states that non-violence e.g. would be right with the struggle that we on earth have to afford against the evil of godlessness, illusion and injustice. It is more an escher-staircase or a Jacob's ladder to heaven we as well have to use walking up as walking down (in fact doing both at the same time).

No, the problem is rather to arrive at an order, the being in order, the fitting in with everyone in one concept of world order. Everybody wants to be in order, but nobody seems, as evidenced by the continuation of warfare, the decay and other miseries, to be really effective in the present postmodern liberality, or to be in agreement, as to how or what that order would be. Given the desire to be effective and to know, we will have to develop the love for the knowledge, the filognosy, which pictures us that order unambiguously. Also will we have to admit that that will be of consequence and that thus something like a reform, restoration, turnover or rebirth must take place. The problem must be identified, the solution must be offered, the counter-arguments must be investigated, the conclusion will have to be drawn and the summary will have to be presented. In other words, without this methodical approach it will all result in nada; and therewith we end up with the beginning of our general thesis concerning the method as before was mentioned in the introduction and the preface. With putting first ancient India providing us the fundamental notion of the method, the nyâya, can one not escape the insight that we with our modern philosophy of enlightenment concerning individual responsibilities are but newcomers to a classical teaching. No reason to be gloomy having lost Descartes out of sight with our 'revolutions', now for our atonement feeling abliged to sit at the feet of the gurus from the East. We were, just restarting as if our system was a computer, not doing that bad at all. From Descartes we for a great deal learned to know the Enlightenment of an autonomous voice of reason from within already. From him are we as persons defined as selves of logic and reason. His writing is still respected as the basis for the rationally founded science to arrive from preconceived premisses and principles at very concrete practical propositions, implementations and political decisions. As for this is the filognosy concerned with the restoration of the principle of the sovereignty of reason; and that on the authority of the fact that we also find that unambiguously with the for India most important philosopher Dvaipâyana Vyâsadeva, also named Bâdarayana, who in the Krishna-bible, the Bhâgavata Purâna 3.26: 62-70, states that only by the power of reason the original person can be awakened, and not by any other case or godhead, not even by the supreme, personal and purely good transcendental godhead Lord Vishnu. He also in his famous Bhagavad Gîtâ, 3.18, provides evidence of this allegiance to the sovereign interest, in stating that the pure devotee is independent. It is that truth which was overlooked in the modern chaos and with which the rationalism of Descartes relativistic with the modern electromagnetic time of J. C. Maxwell (1831-1879) and Einstein seemed to have served its turn at the one hand, while at the other hand the church considered him a threat. But we will, to the fundamental thesis of our investigation, show that just this single vedic truth of logic and reason on itself suffices, despite of all the desperate western philosophizing to our honor. The methodical charter of order of Descartes is hereby valid as the proof that we deliver to the defense of the thesis that we as westerners ourselves are the ones who constantly had the full rights of the individual person and soul in his autonomy of judgement in our banner. it was just the vedic reference that was missing to be really sure that we, be it more intuitive, have our roots in the oldest and most traditional of human culture.

The Charter of Order for the purpose of reasoning about the order of time and the control of forces with the ether the way it is presented as from now, is part of a philosophical treatise that basically formulates our method of approach with our filognostical love for knowledge. The work it is taken from is called: 'On the method'. It was written in the seventeenth century by the french philosopher, who together with the reason and the rationality defended the concept of soul. Het is he who declared 'I think therefore I am' to indicate that a sound mind on itself is enough to be certain of one's existence. Halfway this piece is the method discussed that he discovered, but thus long before him existed in India as a standard for the central philosophy of also religiously living together.

His idea of the method consists of four parts to which the Indian concept dividing the matter in five, adds a preceding thesis. With him the thesis is expressed in the first part of doubt. His dividing accords with what in the nyâya constitutes the counter-argument in response to the doubt before. Descartes' complexity is vedically then the conclusion of the investigation and the principle of completeness corresponds with what in the nyâya is called the siddhânta, the complete truth of the end conclusion or the summary. Thus one knows of Descartes:

1) Doubt, to be sure of what the truth would be.
Division, in order to control the subject of study in its different aspects.
Complexity, or the assigning of such an order that the relationships of the different elements of the division becomes clear.
Completeness, to cover with the order thus achieved the complete of reality in such a manner that as much elements as possible are incorporated.

This together constitutes the essence of the classical philosophical method to uncover the truth of, in our case, the subject of the order of time and the consciousness of time in checking us with the ether. The purpose of this all is to arrive at a vision of our reality free from illusion the way it is now, it was in the past and will be in the future. It is the striving for freedom from illusion which binds philosophy, science and religion in one unambiguous filognosy. Nor to the facts, nor to the principles, nor to the person must we be of illusion.
    Later in section III-A of this site, the department Personal, will René Descartes again be discussed. But now first his treatise which, with his verbose sentences, is not as easy to read must be said. It is only a part of the entire scripture, but that part which discusses the essence of the method. This version is taken from the, by us also upgraded, piece free available on the internet, and was baptized: 'On Doubt, Division, Complexity and Completeness':

'...I was then in Germany, attracted toward that place by the wars in that country, which have not yet been brought to a termination; and as I was returning to the army from the coronation of the emperor, the setting in of winter arrested me in a locality where, as I found no society to interest me, and was besides fortunately undisturbed by any cares or passions, I remained the whole day in seclusion, with full opportunity to occupy my attention with my own thoughts. Of these one of the very first that occurred to me was, that there is seldom so much perfection in works composed of many separate parts, upon which many had laid their hands, as in those completed by a single master. Thus it is observable that the buildings which a single architect has planned and executed, are generally more elegant and convenient than those which several have attempted to improve, by making old walls serve for purposes for which they were not originally built. Thus also, those ancient cities which, from being at first only villages, have become, in course of time, large towns, are usually but ill laid out compared with the regularity constructed towns which a professional architect has freely planned on an open plain; so that although the several buildings of the former may often equal or surpass in beauty those of the latter, yet when one observes their indiscriminate juxtaposition, there a large one and here a small, and the consequent crookedness and irregularity of the streets, one is disposed to allege that chance rather than any human will guided by reason must have led to such an arrangement. And if we consider that nevertheless there have been at all times certain officers whose duty it was to see that private buildings contributed to public ornament, the difficulty of reaching high perfection with but the materials of others to operate on, will be readily acknowledged. In the same way I thought that those nations which, starting from a semi-barbarous state and advancing to civilization by slow degrees, have had their laws successively determined, and, as it were, forced upon them simply by experience of the hurtfulness of particular crimes and disputes, would by this process come to be possessed of less perfect institutions than those which, from the commencement of their association as communities, have followed the appointments of some wise legislator. It is thus quite certain that the constitution of the true religion, the ordinances of which are derived from God, must be incomparably superior to that of every other. And, to speak of human affairs, I believe that the supremacy of Sparta was due not to the goodness of each of its laws in particular, for many of these were very strange, and even opposed to good morals, but to the circumstance that, originated by a single individual, they all tended to a single end. In the same way I thought that the sciences contained in books (such of them at least as are made up of probable reasonings, without demonstrations), composed as they are of the opinions of many different individuals massed together, are farther removed from truth than the simple inferences which a man of good sense using his natural and unprejudiced judgment draws respecting the matters of his experience. And because we have all to pass through a state of infancy to manhood, and have been of necessity, for a length of time, governed by our desires and preceptors (whose dictates were frequently conflicting, while neither perhaps always counseled us for the best), I farther concluded that it is almost impossible that our judgments can be so correct or solid as they would have been, had our reason been mature from the moment of our birth, and had we always been guided by it alone.

It is true, however, that it is not customary to pull down all the houses of a town with the single design of rebuilding them differently, and thereby rendering the streets more handsome; but it often happens that a private individual takes down his own with the view of erecting it anew, and that people are even sometimes constrained to this when their houses are in danger of falling from age, or when the foundations are insecure. With this before me by way of example, I was persuaded that it would indeed be preposterous for a private individual to think of reforming a state by fundamentally changing it in every respect, and overturning it in order to set it up amended; and the same I thought was true of any similar project for reforming the body of the sciences, or the order of teaching them established in the schools: but as for the opinions which up to that time I had embraced, I thought that I could not do better than resolve at once to sweep them wholly away, that I might afterwards be in a position to admit either others more correct, or even perhaps the same when they had undergone the scrutiny of reason. I firmly believed that in this way I should much better succeed in the conduct of my life, than if I built only upon old foundations, and leaned upon principles which, in my youth, I had taken upon trust. For although I recognized various difficulties in this undertaking, these were not, however, without remedy, nor once to be compared with such as attend the slightest reformation in public affairs. Large bodies, if once overthrown, are with great difficulty set up again, or even kept erect when once seriously shaken, and the fall of such is always disastrous. Then if there are any imperfections in the constitutions of states (and that many such exist the diversity of constitutions is alone sufficient to assure us), custom has without doubt materially dealt successfully with their inconveniences, and has even managed to steer altogether clear of, or insensibly corrected a number which keen discernment could not have provided against with equal effect; and, in fine, the defects are almost always more tolerable than the change necessary for their removal; in the same manner that highways which wind among mountains, by being much frequented, become gradually so smooth and convenient, that it is much better to follow them than to seek a straighter path by climbing over the tops of rocks and descending to the bottoms of precipices.

Hence it is that I cannot in any degree approve of those restless and prying who, called neither by birth nor fortune to take part in the management of public affairs, are yet always projecting reforms; and if I thought that this tract contained aught which might justify the suspicion that I was a victim of such folly, I would by no means permit its publication. I have never contemplated anything higher than the reformation of my own opinions, and basing them on a foundation wholly my own. And although my own satisfaction with my work has led me to present here a draft of it, I do not by any means therefore recommend to every one else to make a similar attempt. Those whom God has endowed with a larger measure of genius will entertain, perhaps, designs still more exalted; but for the many I am much afraid lest even the present undertaking be more than they can safely venture to imitate. The single design to strip one's self of all past beliefs is one that ought not to be taken by every one. The majority of men is composed of two classes, for neither of which would this be at all a befitting resolution: in the first place, of those who with more than a due confidence in their own powers, are rash in their judgments and want the patience requisite for orderly and circumspect thinking; whence it happens, that if men of this class once take the liberty to doubt of their accustomed opinions, and quit the beaten highway, they will never be able to thread the byway that would lead them by a shorter course, and will lose themselves and continue to wander for life; in the second place, of those who, possessed of sufficient sense or modesty to determine that there are others who excel them in the power of discriminating between truth and error, and by whom they may be instructed, ought rather to content themselves with the opinions of such than trust for more correct to their own reason.

For my own part, I should doubtless have belonged to the latter class, had I received instruction from but one master, or had I never known the diversities of opinion that from time immemorial have prevailed among men of the greatest learning. But I had become aware, even so early as during my college life, that no opinion, however absurd and incredible, can be imagined, which has not been maintained by some one of the philosophers; and afterwards in the course of my travels I remarked that all those whose opinions are decidedly unacceptable to ours are not in that account barbarians and savages, but on the contrary that many of these nations make an equally good, if not better, use of their reason than we do. I took into account also the very different character which a person brought up from infancy in France or Germany exhibits, from that which, with the same mind originally, this individual would have possessed had he lived always among the Chinese or with savages, and the circumstance that in dress itself the fashion which pleased us ten years ago, and which may again, perhaps, be received into favor before ten years have gone, appears to us at this moment extravagant and ridiculous. I was thus led to infer that the ground of our opinions is far more custom and example than any certain knowledge. And, finally, although such be the ground of our opinions, I remarked that a plurality of voices is no guarantee of truth where it is at all of difficult discovery, as in such cases it is much more likely that it will be found by one than by many. I could, however, select from the crowd no one whose opinions seemed worthy of preference, and thus I found myself constrained, as it were, to use my own reason in the conduct of my life.

But like one walking alone and in the dark, I resolved to proceed so slowly and with such wary, that if I did not advance far, I would at least guard against falling. I did not even choose to dismiss summarily any of the opinions that had crept into my belief without having been introduced by reason, but first of all took sufficient time carefully to satisfy myself of the general nature of the task I was setting myself, and ascertain the true method by which to arrive at the knowledge of whatever lay within the compass of my powers.

Among the branches of philosophy, I had, at an earlier period, given some attention to logic, and among those of the mathematics to geometrical analysis and algebra, -- three arts or sciences which ought, as I conceived, to contribute something to my design. But, on examination, I found that, as for logic, its syllogisms and the majority of its other precepts are of avail - rather in the communication of what we already know, or even as the art of Lully, in speaking without judgment of things of which we are ignorant, than in the investigation of the unknown; and although this science contains indeed a number of correct and very excellent precepts, there are, nevertheless, so many others, and these either injurious or superfluous, mingled with the former, that it is almost quite as difficult to effect a severance of the true from the false as it is to extract a Diana or a Minerva from a rough block of marble. Then as to the analysis of the ancients and the algebra of the moderns, besides that they embrace only matters highly abstract, and, to appearance, of no use, the former is so exclusively restricted to the consideration of figures, that it can exercise the understanding only on condition of greatly fatiguing the imagination; and, in the latter, there is so complete a subjection to certain rules and formulas, that there results an art full of confusion and obscurity calculated to embarrass, instead of a science fitted to cultivate the mind. By these considerations I was induced to seek some other method which would comprise the advantages of the three and be exempt from their defects. And as a multitude of laws often only hinders justice, so that a state is best governed when, with few laws, these are rigidly administered; in like manner, instead of the great number of precepts of which logic is composed, I believed that the four following would prove perfectly sufficient for me, provided I took the firm and unwavering resolution never in a single instance to fail in observing them. 

The first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgement than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt. 

The second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution. 

The third, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning in thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence. 

And fourth, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.

 The long chains of simple and easy reasonings by means of which geometers are accustomed to reach the conclusions of their most difficult demonstrations, had led me to imagine that all things, to the knowledge of which man is competent, are mutually connected in the same way, and that there is nothing so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach, or so hidden that we cannot discover it, provided only we abstain from accepting the false for the true, and always preserve in our thoughts the order necessary for the deduction of one truth from another. And I had little difficulty in determining the objects with which it was necessary to commence, for I was already persuaded that it must be with the simplest and easiest to know, and, considering that of all those who have hitherto sought truth in the sciences, the mathematicians alone have been able to find any demonstrations, that is, any certain and evident reasons, I did not doubt but that such must have been the rule of their investigations. I resolved to commence, therefore, with the examination of the simplest objects, not anticipating, however, from this any other advantage than that to be found in accustoming my mind to the love and nourishment of truth, and to a distaste for all such reasonings as were unsound. But I had no intention on that account of attempting to master all the particular sciences commonly denominated mathematics: but observing that, however different their objects, they all agree in considering only the various relations or proportions subsisting among those objects, I thought it best for my purpose to consider these proportions in the most general form possible, without referring them to any objects in particular, except such as would most facilitate the knowledge of them, and without by any means restricting them to these, that afterwards I might thus be the better able to apply them to every other class of objects to which they are legitimately applicable. Perceiving further, that in order to understand these relations I should sometimes have to consider them one by one and sometimes only to bear them in mind, or embrace them in the totality, I thought that, in order the better to consider them individually, I should view them as subsisting between straight lines, than which I could find no objects more simple, or capable of being more distinctly represented to my imagination and senses; and on the other hand, that in order to retain them in the memory or embrace an aggregate of many, I should express them by certain characters the briefest possible. In this way I believed that I could borrow all that was best both in geometrical analysis and in algebra, and correct all the defects of the one by help of the other.

 And, in point of fact, the accurate observance of these few precepts gave me, I take the liberty of saying, such ease in unraveling all the questions embraced in these two sciences, that in the two or three months I devoted to their examination, not only did I reach solutions of questions I had formerly deemed exceedingly difficult but even as regards questions of the solution of which I continued ignorant; I was enabled, as it appeared to me, to determine the means whereby, and the extent to which a solution was possible; results attributable to the circumstance that I commenced with the simplest and most general truths, and that thus each truth discovered was a rule available in the discovery of subsequent ones. Nor in this perhaps shall I appear too vain, if it be considered that, as the truth on any particular point is one, whoever apprehends the truth, knows all that on that point can be known. The child, for example, who has been instructed in the elements of arithmetic, and has made a particular addition, according to rule, may be assured that he has found, with respect to the sum of the numbers before him, and that in this instance is within the reach of human genius. Now, in conclusion, the method which teaches adherence to the true order, and an exact enumeration of all the conditions of the thing sought includes all that gives certitude to the rules of arithmetic.

But the chief ground of my satisfaction with this method, was the assurance I had of thereby exercising my reason in all matters, if not with absolute perfection, at least with the greatest attainable by me: besides, I was conscious that by its use my mind was becoming gradually habituated to clearer and more distinct conceptions of its objects; and I hoped also, from not having restricted this method to any particular matter, to apply it to the difficulties of the other sciences, with not less success than to those of algebra. I should not, however, on this account have ventured at once on the examination of all the difficulties of the sciences which presented themselves to me, for this would have been contrary to the order prescribed in the method, but observing that the knowledge of such is dependent on principles borrowed from philosophy, in which I found nothing certain, I thought it necessary first of all to endeavor to establish its principles. And because I observed, besides, that an inquiry of this kind was of all others of the greatest moment, and one in which rashness and anticipation in judgment were most to be dreaded, I thought that I ought not to approach it till I had reached a more mature age (being at that time but twenty-three), and had first of all employed much of my time in preparation for the work, as well by eradicating from my mind all the erroneous opinions I had up to that moment accepted, as by amassing variety of experience to afford materials for my reasonings, and by continually exercising myself in my chosen method with a view to increased skill in its application.' 

Thus far René Descartes on the method. It is this method which, departing from the true religion of the sane mind of tolerance and prudence, from single-minded witnessing through doubt arrives at a clearly to oversee science incorporating each and everyone. That mathematically correct deduction from the necessary and inevitable order which non-repressively departs from a certain conceptual simplicity, ultimately has brought us the power of reforming the reason with which we first of all created this website and we ourselves - not only literary operating thus - have found a life. Not to say that rationalism would be our final belief, or that we for that reason would want to philosophize endlessly about the multitude of philosophers* also commenting on this subject, but because the method as such reflects the expression in our western terms of a truth, as Descartes says a truth of principles, which we find presented in the oldest scriptures of India. We, according our fundamental thesis, want to demonstrate with it, that concerning the time and the order thereof with the ether, of which Descartes said that the universe is purely made of it, it in the foregoing cultures in the world is the way the dutch philosopher and ethical thinker Baruch Spinoza filognostically correctly stated it: 'Still can the greater of nature not be denied and retains she her fixed and immutable order'.


For more info on the person of this philosopher and his works and place in history go to the renown ego's page

* See the timelinks-page and the quotes-page for more philosophers about time.

* For more info on this philosopher and his works and place in history, see the Renown Ego's - page.

* See for an overview of the history of philosophy Bryan Magee's highly readable book 'The Story of Philosophy' (1998, Dorling Kinserly Limited London).

* Other philosophy-links: the Linking-Library - philosophy.

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